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Marriott Marquis 
I begin with some interesting statistical information just 
published by the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts relating to criminal appeals in the Second Circuit. For 
the fiscal year ending in 1988, we terminated 529 criminal 
appeals, constituting about 18% of our total number of all cases 
terminated. In 1988, 291 cases were terminated on the merits. 
Of these, 234 were affirmed, 31 reversed and the remainder 
terminated by dismissal, remand or other non-merit disposition. 
The reversal rate for convictions in 1988 was 10.8%, up over 2-
1/2% percentage points from the 8.1% reversal rate in 1987. This 
is not necessarily to be taken by the defense bar as a source of 
great encouragement. In any event, our median time for 
disposition, counting from the filing of the notice of appeal in 
a criminal .. ~ase, is 6 months, the fastest in the nation. If you 
can't get a reversal, you can at least get a rapid decision. 
The last item in your coursebook is my outline on Federal 
Criminal Appellate Practice in the Second Circuit. The outline 
covers the subject of appealability, beginning at page 227, 
mechanics of appeals, beginning at page 232, scope of review, 
beginning at page 239, appellate advocacy at 242 and 
decisionmaking at 247. I hope that the outline will be of use to 
you in prosecuting criminal appeals in the second circuit. As a 
matter of my own £-interest, I ask that you give special 
attention to the section on appellate advocacy. My colleagues 
and I would very much appreciate a general improvement in the 
quality of briefing as well as oral argument. On the last page 
of the outline, page 251, I have listed some suggested references 
that may be helpful in preparing for the presentation of a 
criminal appeal. 
Due to time constraints and the rule that a good appellate 
lawyer should limit argument to a few good points, I intend to 
cover only two topics -- one touched upon in my outline and one 
not covered in the materials at all. The first is the importance 
of making a proper record of evidentiary objections, and the 
second is the use of 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the principal vehicle for 
post-conviction relief lowing the completion of the appellate 
process. I hope to leave some time for questions and comments on 
anything you may care to discuss relating to appeals and post-
conviction relief. 
With respect to the admission of evidence, Rule 103(a)(l) of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a timely objection or 
motion to strike with the specific ground for objection stated on 
the record, unless the specific ground is apparent from the 
context. Rule 103(a)(2) requires an offer of proof in the case 
of a ruling excluding evidence, unless the evidence to be offered 
is apparent from the context. Even if there is a proper 
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objection or offer of proof, however, there is no error unless 
substantial rights are affected. Of course, Rule 103(d) provides 
that an appellate court can take notice of plain errors that 
affect substantial rights but are not brought to the attention of 
the trial court. This is the evidentiary counterpart of the 
general rule that an error not objected to at trial will not be 
considered on appeal unless it can be classified as "plain 
error." 
A recent case before a panel of my court involved an 
appellant who was convicted after a jury trial for possessing and 
distributing two vials of "crack." On appeal, she contended that 
the district court erred in allowing the government to cross 
examine her about her general familiarity with cocaine. In a 
summary order, the panel rejected the contention, citing the 
failure to object to the evidence, and holding that there was no 
plain error in light of the district court's broad discretion in 
evidentiary matters and the appellant's denial on direct 
examination that she was a dealer in cocaine. One can only 
speculate what the result would have been if the objection were 
properly made. 
To summarize: Admission or exclusion of evidence is not 
error unless a party's substantial rights are affected and (1) a 
specific objection is made in cases of admission and (2) an offer 
of proof is made in cases of exclusion. Here are some actual 
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objections to the admission of evidence that are improper because 
they lack the necessary specificity: 
"He's getting close to that legal problem, your honor." 
"That's unfair, your honor!" 
"That's unfair, your honor and he knows it!" 
"I've been listening to Mr. McNamara for half an hour, your 
honor, and if he persists in testifying, I'll have no 
alternative but to mark him and offer him in evidence." 
"Incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial ... and against 
the interests of justice ... and just no good." 
"He's getting on dangerous ground, your honor." 
"Objection, your honor. Counsel knows that's totally 
improper." 
"Judge, could we get on with something that has to do with 
this case?" 
"Objection, your honor, that's highly unusual." 
My favorite: "Objection, your honor, that evidence is very 
unfavorable to my client." 
How about this actual question and objection?: 
Question. When he went, had you gone and had she, if she 
wanted to and were able, for the time being excluding 
all the restraints on her not to go also, would he have 
brought you meaning you and she with him to the station? 
Mr. Brooks. Objection. That question should be taken out 
and shot. 
In some of those questions, of course, the specific ground 
for objection may have been apparent from the context. That 
certainly was true of the last objection. You can and should 
always avoid trouble by being specific. Sometimes, a very brief 
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objection will do it: objection -- irrelevant; objection --
privileged communication. More often, some brief explanation of 
the objection in plain language will comply with the Rule and 
preserve the objection. Here are some illustrations: 
LEADtr-..d- Objection, your honor; 
counsel is putting words in the 
wit'.~ mouth. This is le:iding. 
HEARSAY~ Objection, your honor/the 
jury c:innot tell if someorn?/who 
is not a witness was telling the 
truth. This)~>~ca~say: / 
BEST EvJDENCE...:,., ObJect10!J, your 
honor, it's not fair for 0e defen-
dant to talk about what is in that 
letter and not let ~h" jury see it. 
Not the best evide ce. 
Christopher J. ivlunc , Chief Depu-
ty District Attorney µ~ Denver, Col-
orado, is a lawyer who has developed 
a whole series of plain language objec-
tions. Here are so 
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e of his: 
ARGUMENTATIVE Objection. It's im-
proper t ask a witness to agree 
with yo r little theory or argu-
ment: ;You're supposed to ask 
questions about the facts. 
I RRELEYA~T- Objection. That has 
nothing to do with the things this 
j ry has to decide. 
SPEC ATIVE- Objection. He's asking 
the witness to guess. Witnesses arc 
supposed to tell us what they 
:\ know, not speculate. 
EARSAY- Objection. The witness 
should only be asked what he 
knows, not what somebody else 
\ told him. 
B~\ONDTHE ScorE- Objection. This is 
\getting off the subject. It is 
peyond the scope of direct and 
~~olatcs Rule 611 (b ). 
lNSUFFIClENT FccNDATION - Objection. 
Without more background there 
is nO'way to tell whether this is 
reliable enough to even be con-
sidered, much less believed. 
NMZRAl l\T- Objec~ion. He's a'.'iki n~ 
the witncs:i lo give a -;pccd1 in-
ste:1d of :ins\vering questions. The 
witness might accidentally say 
things that arc'j\mproper and he 
shouldn't be put in that position. 
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Much time, of course, is wasted in making objections that 
take you nowhere, clutter up the record and serve no purpose. 
Here are some examples of those: 
(a) "Self-serving" -- Hopefully, all evidence adduced by a 
party serves the interests of that party. By itself, the 
objection means nothing. 
(b) "Calls for operation of witnesses mind's" -- It is our 
fervent desire that the mind of a witness become operational in 
response to any question. There are cases where the state of 
mind is the principal issue. 
(c) "Non-responsive answer" A non-responsive answer is a 
problem only for the questioner and I conclude my discussion of 
evidentiary objections with some actual illustrations of non-
responsive answers. Of course, the attorney asking the questions 
is responsible for these non-responsive answers. These questions 
illustrate that a well-prepared witness, like a well-prepared 
lawyer, is beautiful to behold but all too rare: 
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• 
.1 •r-t\ i:· ~ l v """ I(. l 41 G t 1:.. ..) 
o .( ;f L i.t. /IJ' ,) w 
now in session, and here are my favorite tra:nsqmp1s, 
recorded by America's keepers of the word. 
'. 'trt:msquips '' in this chapter of the book are copyrighted 
hand Reporters Assodation, and are reprinted with their permission.]: 
Q. Did you stay all night with this man in New, York? 
),~·· I refuse to answer thatquestion. 
Q. Did you stay all night with this.· inan in Chicago? 
A. I refuse to answer that question. 
Q. Did you ever stay all night with this man in Miami? 
A. No. 
Q. James stood back and shot Tommy Lee? 
A. Yes. 
Q. •And then Tommy Lee pulled out his gun and shot James 
··in the fracas? 
A. (After a hesitation) No sir, just above it. 
Q. Have yofi ever been arrested? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What for? 
A. Aggravating· a female. 
Q. You say you're innocent, yet five people swore they saw 
you steal a watch. · 
A. Your Honor, I can produce 500 people who didn't see me 
steal it. · Q. Doctor, did you say he wasshot in the woods? 
A .. No, t said he was shot in the lumbar region. 
~-·~~~~,~~-- ' 
\. Q~When he went, had you gone and, .. hact..she,·if she wanted 
Q. Now, Mrs. Johnson, how was your first marriage 
terminated? 
A. By death. 
Q. And by whose death was it terminated? 
0. What is vour name? 
A. Ernestine McDowell. 
Q. And what is your marital status? 
A. Fair. 
Q. Are you married? 
A. No, I'm divorced. 
Q. What did your husband do before you divorced him? 
A. A lot of things that I didn't know about. 
Q. Do you know how far pregnant you are right now? 
A. I will be three months November 8th. 
Q. Apparently then, the date of conception was August 8th? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What were you and your husband doing at that time? 
) to fili(! wer~ .. ~ble, for_)~g~.,timtr'5eing excluding all the 
1-1 restramts on li~unot~o go also, would he have brought 
J . you mearU.ng>you amf she. wi!li him to the station? 
( ~.fvi;R···BROOKS. Objection. Thar'questi2.I1 .. should be taken 
\. . out and shot. '· •d • ,_ 
Q .. At the time you first saw Dr. McCarty, had you ever seen 
him prior to that time? 
Q. Did the lady standing in the driveway subsequently identify 
herself to you? 
A. Yes, she did. 
Q. Who did she say she was? 
A. She said she was the owner of the dog's wife. 
q. Now I'm going to show you what has been marked as 
fJI' State's Exhibit No. 2 and ask if you recognize the picture. 
A. John Fletcher. · 
Q. That's you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you were present when that picture was taken, right? 
The primary vehicle for post-conviction relief following the 
completion of the appellate process is a motion under 28 u.s.c. § 
2255. The statute for the most part supplants the habeas corpus 
petition for federal prisoners by providing a commensurate remedy 
in the sentencing court. Indeed, the Supreme Court has indicated 
that 2255, if it reaches the claim of error, must be used in 
preference to habeas. This is not considered to constitute an 
unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. 
Section 2255 provides: 
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court 
established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be 
released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed 
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to 
impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in 
excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is 
otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the 
court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside 
or correct the sentence. 
A motion for such relief may be made at any time. 
There are thus four grounds for relief: 
1. That the sentence was imposed in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States. 
2. That the court was without jurisdiction to impose such 
sentence. 
3. That the sentence was in excess of the maximum 
authorized by law. 
4. That the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral 
attack. 
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Generally, the failure to raise a non-constitutional or non-
jurisdictional claim on direct appeal precludes assertion of the 
claim in the collateral 2255 proceeding. However, there are 
exceptional circumstances where even a non-constitutional or non-
jurisdictional error can result in a complete miscarriage of 
justice, justifying collateral relief. I'll give you an example 
of exceptional circumstances in a little while. With respect to 
claims of constitutional or jurisdictional error, however, the 
rule in the Second Circuit is that such claims may be raised in a 
2255 proceeding, even if they were not raised on direct appeal. 
There is an exception to this rule in the Second Circuit, but we 
don't know what it is yet. If you will examine Brennan v. United 
States, 867 F.2d 111, 117 n.l (2d Cir. 1989), you will see that 
we have not made up our collective minds as to whether the proper 
standard for the exception is the deliberate bypass test or the 
cause and prejudice test. That's a loose end that one of you 
will ask us to tie up in the near future. For purposes of our 
discussion, however, it suffices to say that constitutional and 
jurisdictional errors generally can be raised by way of 2255 even 
if not raised on the original direct appeal. Brennan did not 
involve such claims and went off on a failure to raise a statute 
of limitations objection at trial and a failure to challenge the 
characterization of the New York State Supreme Court as a RICO 
enterprise on appeal. As to the failure to object to the jury 
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instruction on statute of limitations grounds at trial, Brennan 
failed the cause and prejudice test applicable to trial error. 
As to the failure to raise the enterprise question on appeal, 
Brennan failed the exceptional circumstances test. 
We found that the exceptional circumstances test was met in 
Ingber v. Enzor, 841 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1988), and I refer you to 
my opinion in that case for some detailed discussion of 2255. In 
Ingber, we found that 2255 properly was used to vacate a 
conviction for mail fraud in light of the Supreme Court's 
decision McNally v. United States. The McNally holding that 
the mail fraud statute was limited to the protection of property 
rights -- was decided after Ingber's conviction was affirmed. 
McNally overruled long-established Second Circuit precedent that 
deprivation of intangible rights not related to money or property 
was punishable under the mail fraud statute. Thus, those 
convicted under our erroneous view of the mail fraud statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 1341, were convicted of conduct that was not a crime. 
We held that the retroactive application of McNally was 
necessary in order to avoid an unfair result, despite the fact 
that Ingber had failed to present his challenge either on appeal 
or in a petition for writ of certiorari. The challenge of course 
was not a constitutional one, and the time to file for certiorari 
had expired well before our precedents were displaced by McNally. 
The exceptional circumstances excusing the requirement for 
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raising the claim on appeal obviously were the entrenched 
precedents in relation to the scope of the mail fraud statute. 
Appeal on the question of deprivation of intangible rights in a 
mail fraud scheme would have been futile at the time of Ingber's 
conviction. We said: 
Were we to penalize Ingber for failing to 
challenge such entrenched precedent, we would 
ascribe to attorneys and their clients the 
power to prognosticate with greater precision 
than the judges of this court. Such a rule 
would encourage appeal of even well-settled 
points of law. 
Other circuits have followed us in using § 2255 to apply McNally 
retroactively. 
The following circumstances have been held to justify 
challenges under § 2255 in this circuit: 
A. Where the indictment on its face fails to state a 
federal offense. 
B. Where a guilty plea was based on an insufficient factual 
foundation. 
C. Where a guilty plea was induced by a prosecutor's false 
promise. 
D. Where counsel was not admitted to any bar, although the 
disbarment of a defendant's counsel during a pretrial suppression 
hearing was held not to require the vacation of a sentence where 
the attorney ceased representation immediately upon learning of 
the disbarment. 
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E. A claim of perjured testimony. 
F. The incompetency of the defendant at the time of court 
proceedings. 
G. Where it was alleged that separate judgment of 
conviction arose out of a single criminal transaction, raising 
questions of double jeopardy. 
H. Where a claim of spillover effects of a double-jeopardy-
barred criminal charge was raised. 
I. Where the constitutional authority of a de facto judge 
was challenged. 
Where a motion addresses the execution of a sentence rather 
than the legality of the conviction or the propriety of the 
sentence imposed, relief is not available under § 2255. I 
recently served on a panel that heard an appeal from the denial 
of a 2255 motion made by a prisoner who sought correction of his 
sentence on the claim that he was in custody during the time 
spent in a hospital prior to sentencing. In a summary order, we 
held that review of the execution of appellant's sentence could 
be obtained not by a 2255 motion but through a writ of habeas 
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Since the review by way of habeas 
corpus could be had only in the court having jurisdiction over 
appellant's custodian, we held that jurisdiction was lacking in 
the Eastern District, the place of conviction. 
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Rules and forms for proceeding under § 2255 have been 
adopted by the Supreme Court. They are found under the title, 
"Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings in the United States 
District Courts." The procedural rules should be examined 
carefully before making a 2255 motion. After the motion is 
filed, it is presented the judge who presided at the movant trial 
and imposed sentence. If the appropriate judge is unavailable, 
it is presented to another judge of the same district court. The 
judge may either order the summary dismissal of the motion or 
order the U.S. Attorney to answer. Discovery is permitted, and 
expanded record may be directed, and an evidentiary hearing may 
be held. If there is a hearing, counsel must be appointed under 
the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act to represent an 
indigent defendant. If it appears that an evidentiary hearing is 
not required, the judge shall make such disposition of the motion 
as justice requires. 
Section 2255 itself provides that the court "shall not be 
required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar 
relief on behalf of the same prisoner." Consideration of 
successive motions may be denied, however, "only if (1) the same 
ground presented in the subsequent application was determined 
adversely to the applicant on the prior application, (2) the 
prior determination was on the merits, and (3) the ends of 
justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the 
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subsequent application." 
Although § 2255 provides a means of remedy for a prisoner in 
custody under sentence, the custody requirement has been read 
liberally so that any conditions that significantly confine and 
restrain will suffice. Accordingly, custody has been found where 
the defendant was released on his own recognizance after 
conviction in state court; where the prisoner was discharged 
while his motion was awaiting appellate review; and where the 
movant was free on parole. The critical moment in determining 
custody is when the motion is filed. The fact that a successful 
collateral attack may not result in release from custody is no 
bar to considering the motion. As the rule provides, the movant 
also must be under sentence for the conviction under attack. 
An order entered under § 2255 is appealable, and the time 
limits for civil appeals apply. Since the United States always 
is a party, notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days of the 
entry of the district court's judgment. The United States as 
well as the movant may appeal. 
Section 2255 provides an important and flexible tool for 
achieving post-conviction, post-appeal relief. I commend it to 
your consideration. 
I'm open for questions. 
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FEDERAL CRIMINAL APPELLATE PRACTICE 
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
by 
HON. ROGER J. MINER 
United States Circuit Judge 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
May 12, 1989 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL APPELLATE PRACTICE 
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
APPEALABILITY 
I. Final Judgment of Conviction Required 
1. Except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme 
Court, appeals from all final decisions of the District Courts 
must be prosecuted in the Courts of Appeals. 28 u.s.c. § 1291. 
2. The final decision in a criminal case is the final 
judgment of conviction, a document signed by the Judge and 
entered by the Clerk only after sentence is imposed. See Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 32(b)(l); Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212-13 
(1937). 
3. Congress intended to avoid piecemeal disposition of 
criminal matters because "encouragement of delay is fatal to the 
vindication of the criminal law." Cobbledick v. United States, 
309 U.S .. 323, 325 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.).. "The rule of 
finality has particular force in criminal prosecutions .. " United 
States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 853-54 (1978). 
4. Appeals from nonfinal decisions will be dismissed sua 
sponte for lack of jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals. In re 
United States, 565 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 
962 (1978) .. 
II. Exceptions to the Final Judgment Requirement 
1. The collateral order doctrine has been developed to 
permit defendants to appeal interlocutory orders in certain 
limited circumstances: The order must conclusively determine a 
disputed question, resolve an issue completely separate from the 
merits of the action and effectively be unreviewable on appeal 
from a final judgment. Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 
(1984). 
2. Appeals under the collateral order doctrine have been 
accepted for the purpose of reviewing the following: 
(a) Denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on 
grounds of double jeopardy. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 
651, 662 (1977). 
(b) Denial of a motion to dismiss under the speech and 
debate clause of the Constitution. Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 
500, 507-08 (1979). 
(c) Commitment for hospitalization pursuant to 18 
u.s.c. § 424l(d) because of mental incompetence to stand trial. 
United States v. Gold, 790 F.2d 235, 238-39 C2d Cir. 1986). 
(d) Order denying dismissal of an indictment where a 
"colorable claim" of violation of a prior plea agreement is made. 
United States v. Abbamonte, 759 F.2d 1065, 1071 C2d Cir. 1985). 
Ce) Decisions relating to bail. Stack v. Boyle, 342 
U.S. 1, 6 (1951). 18 u.s.c. § 3145 (Supp. II 1984) now provides for 
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the prompt determination of an appeal from a release or detention 
order .. 
(f) Pre-trial restraining orders under the forfeiture 
provisions of the RICO and CCE Acts. United States v. Gelb, 826 
F.2d 1175 C2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 
1400 C2d Cir. 1988) Cin bane) .. 
3. Appeals under the collateral order doctrine have been 
rejected for the purpose of reviewing the following: 
(a) Disqualification of defense counsel. Flanagan v. 
United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984). 
(b) Denial of motion to dismiss on grounds of 
prosecutorial vindictiveness. United States v. Hollywood Motor 
Car Co., 458 U.S .. 263 (1982). 
Cc) Denial of motion to dismiss on sixth amendment 
speedy trial grounds. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 
857 (1978). 
(d) Continuances under the provisions of the Speedy 
Trial Act. United States v. Gurary, 793 F.2d 468 C2d Cir. 1986) 
(extensions of time granted both to return an indictment and to 
conduct a preliminary hearing). 
Ce) Collateral protective order prohibiting defendant 
from disclosing confidential documents made available to him by 
government. United States v. Caparros, 800 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 
1986). 
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(f) Denial of motion to dismiss indictment for alleged 
grand jury abuses. Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, No. 
87-1905 (U.S. Mar. 28, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, US file). 
(g) Order denying preindictment motion for return of 
property under Fed. R. Crim. P. 4l(e) if it is tied in any way to 
a criminal prosecution in esse against movant. Standard Drywall, 
Inc. v. United States, 668 F.2d 156 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 456 
U.S. 927 (1982) (grand jury investigation pending). Compare 
United States Postal Serv. v. C.E.C. Servs., No. 88-6196, slip. 
op. at 1767-68 (2d Cir. Mar. 6, 1989) (grand jury dismissed 
without returning indictment). 
III. Appeals by the Government 
1. While the double jeopardy clause prohibits the appeal of 
a judgment of acquittal, the government is provided a statutory 
right to appeal as to certain matters in criminal cases. 18 
u.s.c. § 3731 allows appeals from: 
(a} Order dismissing an indictment or information or 
granting a new trial after verdict or judgment, as to any one or 
more counts, except where the double jeopardy clause bars further 
prosecution. 
(b) Suppression or exclusion of evidence, where the 
defendant has not been put in jeopardy, before the verdict or 
finding, if the United States Attorney certifies that the appeal 
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is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence 
constitutes substantial proof of a material fact. 
Cc) Release of a person charged with or convicted of 
an offense, or denial of a motion for revocation or modification 
of conditions of release. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b) (motion 
for revocation or amendment of detention order). 
2. The government may appeal from the dismissal of a 
portion of a count of an indictment only if the portion arguably 
could have been set forth as a separate count. United States v. 
Tom, 787 F.2d 65, 77 C2d Cir. 1986). 
3. A pre-trial ruling denying the government's motion to 
use certain evidence at trial is appealable by the government. 
United States v. Valencia, 826 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1987). 
4. Orders granting motions to suppress wiretap evidence or 
denying wiretap applications are appealable if the United States 
Attorney certifies that the appeal is not taken for purposes of 
delay. 18 U.S.C. § 2518Cl0)(b). 
IV. Sentence 
1. Under the new sentencing provisions, both the government 
and the defendant have the right to appeal to the Court of 
Appeals for review of a final sentence. 18 u.s.c. § 3742(a), 
(b). 
2. An appeal of an otherwise final sentence imposed by a 
Magistrate may be taken to the District Court as though the 
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appeal were to a Court of Appeals from the District Court. 18 
u.s.c. § 3742(f). 
V. Appeal After Conditional Plea 
1. A defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or 
nolo contendere, reserving in writing the right to review the 
adverse determination of any pre-trial motion on appeal from the 
judgment. The approval of the court and the consent of the 
government is required for a conditional plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 
11Ca){2). 
2. A defendant who prevails on appeal must be permitted to 
withdraw the conditional plea. Id. 
MECHANICS OF APPEAL 
I. Pre-Appeal Proceedings in the District Court. 
1. The District Court must advise a defendant found guilty 
after trial of the right to appeal and of the right to apply for 
leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32{a)(2). 
2. If the defendant so requests, the Clerk of the District 
Court must prepare and file a Notice of Appeal on behalf of the 
defendant. Id. 
3. As to any defendant found guilty after trial, the 
District Judge must complete and transmit to the Clerk of the 
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District Court for transmittal to the Court of Appeals "Form A," 
required by the Revised Second Circuit Plan To Expedite The 
Processing Of Criminal Appeals (hereinafter "Plan"), containing, 
inter alia, the following information: 
(a) Sentencing data; 
(b) Whether any transcripts were ordered during trial; 
Cc) Whether defendant is eligible for appointment of 
counsel on appeal pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act; whether 
there is any reason that trial counsel should not be continued on 
appeal; and whether the minutes of trial should be transcribed at 
the expense of the government. 
See Plan, sec. 1. 
II. The Notice of Appeal and Related Matters. 
1. The Notice of Appeal by a defendant is filed in the 
District Court within ten days after the entry of the judgment or 
order appealed from. If filed before such entry, but after 
announcement of a decision, sentence or order, the Notice of 
Appeal is treated as filed on the date of entry. Fed. R. App. P. 
4 ( b) • 
2. An appeal from a judgment of conviction also may be 
taken within ten days after the entry of an order denying a 
timely motion in arrest of judgment or for a new trial; if the 
motion for new trial is made on the ground of newly discovered 
evidence, the extension of time to appeal is conditioned on the 
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making of the motion within ten days after the entry of judgment. 
Id. 
3. A Notice of Appeal by the government is filed in the 
District Court within thirty days after the entry of the judgment 
or order appealed from; "entry" means entering in the criminal 
docket. Id. 
4. The time for filing a Notice of Appeal may be extended 
for thirty days, with or without a motion, by the District Court 
"[u]pon a showing of excusable neglect •.. before or after the 
time has expired." Id. 
5. The filing fee ($5) and the docketing fee ($100) are 
paid to the Clerk of the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1917; 
Fed. R. App. P. 3(e); Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States (1987) (Judicial Conference 
Schedule of Fees for the United States Courts of Appeals eff. May 
1, 1987); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1913. 
6. The Clerk of the District Court serves notice of the 
filing by mailing copies of the Notice of Appeal to counsel of 
record for each party other than appellant. In a case of an 
appeal by a criminal defendant, the Clerk serves a copy of the 
Notice of Appeal, either personally or by mail, upon the 
defendant. Fed. R. App. P. 3(d). 
7. The Clerk also has the duty to transmit copies of the 
Notice of Appeal and the docket entries to the Clerk of the Court 
of Appeals, who must promptly enter the appeal in the appropriate 
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records. Id.; Plan, sec. 2. The appeal then is entered upon the 
Court of Appeals docket. Fed. R. App. P. 12Ca). 
8. At the time of filing the Notice of Appeal, counsel for 
the appellant must furnish "Form B," required by the Plan, to the 
Clerk of the District Court. This form certifies that the 
transcript has been ordered and satisfactory arrangements have 
been made with the court reporter for payment of the cost of the 
transcript. Plan, sec. 3. 
9. When a transcript has been ordered, the court reporter 
must notify the Clerk of the Court of Appeals "immediately" of 
the estimated length of the transcript and the estimated date of 
completion. Id., sec. 4. 
10. The time for completion of the transcript "shall not 
exceed thirty days from the order date except under unusual 
circumstances which first must be approved by the Court of 
Appeals upon a showing of need." Id. 
III. Proceedings in the Court of Appeals 
1. As soon as possible after the Notice of Appeal is filed 
in a criminal case, a scheduling order is issued in the Court of 
Appeals providing: 
(a) That the record on appeal be docketed within twenty 
days after filing of the Notice of Appeal; 
(b) That the brief and appendix of appellant be filed 
not later than thirty days after the date on which the 
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transcription of the trial minutes is scheduled to be completed, 
unless a longer or shorter period is established for good cause 
shown. 
(c) That the Appellee's Brief be filed not later than 
thirty days after the date on which Appellant's Brief and 
Appendix are scheduled to be filed, unless a longer or shorter 
period is fixed for good cause shown. 
Cd) That the argument will be heard during the week 
designated in the order. 
Plan, sec. 5. 
2. Although not referred to in the Plan, a Reply Brief may 
be filed and served by an appellant within fourteen days after 
service of the Brief of the Appellee. Except for good cause 
shown, a Reply Brief must be filed at least three days before 
argument. Fed. R. App. P. 3l(a). 
3. The Court of Appeals may enter any other orders deemed 
desirable for prompt disposition of appeals. These include 
orders: appointing counsel on appeal; setting date for filing 
transcriptions of trial minutes; requiring attorneys for 
co-appellants to share a copy of the transcript; and instructing 
the Clerk to permit counsel to remove and examine the record. 
Plan, sec. 6. 
4. The record on appeal consists of the original papers and 
exhibits filed in the District Court, any transcript of 
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proceedings, and a certified copy of the docket entries prepared 
by the Clerk of the District Court. Fed. R. App. P. lO(a). 
5. The record on appeal must be filed by the date fixed in 
the scheduling order. See supra III.l.(a). Motions to extend 
time to file the record ordinarily will not be granted. If the 
transcript is incomplete, the record should be filed and 
supplemented upon completion of the transcript. Plan, sec. 5(a). 
6. Each appellant is required to take such action as may be 
necessary "to enable the clerk to assemble and transmit the 
record .. " Fed.. R. App.. P. 11 (a) .. 
7. Any differences of the parties with respect to whether 
the record discloses what occurred in the District Court must be 
settled by the District Court. Also, the Court of Appeals may 
direct that omissions or misstatements be corrected and may order 
a supplemental record to be certified and transmitted. Fed. R. 
App .. P. 10 ( e ) . 
8. Section 11 of the Second Circuit Rules Supplementing 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (hereinafter "Supp. Rules") 
urges the parties to agree as to the exhibits necessary for the 
determination of the appeal. Failing that, each party may 
designate the exhibits considered necessary, and all 
non-designated exhibits remain with the District Court Clerk 
unless requested by the Court of Appeals. The Rule does not 
relieve the parties of their obligations with respect to 
preparation of the Appendix under Supp. Rule § 30. 
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IV.. Motions 
I. The time and manner of making motions are governed by 
Supp. Rule § 27. Notice of Motion Form T-1080 must be employed, 
and a copy of the lower court decision must accompany the 
affidavits, memoranda of law and exhibits. Supp. Rule § 
27(a)(l)-(2) .. 
2. Substantive motions normally are heard by the regular 
panels sitting on Tuesday of each week, and oral argument is 
permitted. A single judge may hear substantive motions when the 
court is in recess. Id .. § 27(b), (f) .. 
3. On a motion for release pending appeal: 
(a) Appellant must demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence that he or she is not likely to flee or pose a danger to 
the safety of any other person or the community if released. 
18 u.s.c. § 3143 (b)(l). 
(b) Appellant also must demonstrate that the appeal is 
not for the purpose of delay and raises a substantial question of 
law or fact likely to result in reversal, new trial or a sentence 
that does not involve imprisonment. Id.§ 3143(b)(2). A 
"substantial" question is one that is "close" or could very well 
be decided the other way; it is more than non-frivolous. United 
States v. Randell, 761 F.2d 122, 125 C2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 
U.S .. 1008 (1985) .. 
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(c) An application for release after conviction must be 
made in the District Court in the first instance. Fed. R. App. 
P. 9Cb). 
Cd> No appeal lies from district court's presentence 
denial of bail pending appeal of sentence. United States v. 
Friedman, 813 F.2d 579 C2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam). 
4. A sentence of imprisonment may be stayed if a defendant 
is released pending appeal. Sentences of fine or probation also 
may be stayed pending appeal. Fed. R. Crim. P. 38; Fed. R. App. 
P. 8(c). 
5. Procedural Motions generally are determined by a single 
judge without oral argument. Supp. Rule§ 27(f). Motions for 
leave to file oversized briefs, to postpone the date for filing 
briefs or to change the date of argument must be made not less 
than seven days before the brief is due or the argument is 
scheduled, in the absence of exceptional circumstances. "Motions 
to postpone the dates set for filing briefs or for argument are 
not viewed with favor and will be granted only under 
extraordinary c1rcumstances." Plan, sec. 9. 
SCOPE OF REVIEW 
I. Errors of Fact 
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1. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting conviction, the defendant "bears a very heavy burden." 
United States v. Soto, 716 F.2d 989, 991 (2d Cir. 1983). 
2. A guilty verdict must be sustained if "any rational 
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 
307, 319 (1979). 
3. In app~als by defendants, "[p]ieces of evidence must be 
viewed not in isolation but in conjunction, and the reviewing 
court must draw all favorable inferences and resolve all issues 
of credibility in favor of the prosecution." United States v. 
Khan, 787 F.2d 28, 34 (2d Cir. 1986). 
4. The claim of insufficiency of evidence generally is 
preserved for appeal by a motion for a judgment of acquittal made 
at the close of all the evidence. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29; 
United States v. Kaplan, 586 F.2d 980, 982 n.4 (2d Cir. 1978). 
5. A District Court's finding of consent to search will not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous. United States v. 
Arango-Correa, 851 F.2d 54, 57 C2d Cir. 1988). 
6. Although the general rule is that a District Court's 
findings of fact may not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous, 
see United States v. Rios, 856 F.2d 493, 495 C2d Cir. 1988) (per 
curiam), the Court of Appeals must examine the entire record and 
make an independent determination of the issue of voluntariness 
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when the privilege against compelled self-incrimination is 
claimed. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 348 (1976). 
7. If a trial court's finding is sustained by the evidence 
as to a question of fourth amendment custody, "[t]he court of 
appeals [is] mistaken in substituting for that finding its view 
of the evidence." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 
(1980) (plurality). But see United States v. Ceballos, 812 F.2d 
42, 46-47 & n.l (2d Cir. 1987). 
II. Errors of Law 
1. Admission or exclusion of evidence is not error unless a 
party's substantial rights are affected and (1) a specific 
objection is made in cases of admission or (2) an offer of proof 
is made in cases of exclusion. Fed. R. Evid. 103(a). 
2. Giving or failing to give an instruction to a jury may 
not be assigned as error unless specific objection is made before 
the jury retires. Fed. R. Crim. P. 30. 
3. "An appellate court can reverse the determination below 
for mere error in law, and does not apply the clearly erroneous 
standard in reviewing determinations of law." 2 Fed. Proc. L. 
Ed. § 3:652. 
4. Errors not affecting substantial rights are to be 
disregarded. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) Charmless error rule). An 
error not objected to at the trial level will not be considered 
on appeal unless it falls into the "plain error" category. See 
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United States v. Calfon, 607 F.2d 29, 30 C2d Cir. 1979) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1085 (1980). 
5. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may 
be noticed on appeal although they were not called to the 
attention of the trial court. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Plain 
error must go to the very essence of the case. Calfon, 607 F.2d 
at 31. 
6. Constitutional error can be regarded as harmless only 
where it can be said to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1970), although some 
constitutional errors involve rights so important as to require 
automatic reversal, see, ~, Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 
331 (1970) (double jeopardy). 
7. An abuse of discretion standard has been applied to 
review district court decisions relating to the following: 
severance, consolidation, continuance, change of venue, and 
motion to withdraw guilty plea. 9 Fed. Proc. L. Ed. § 22:1303 et 
~·i see, ~, United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95, 106 (2d 
Cir. 1982) (continuance), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082 (1983). 
APPELLATE ADVOCACY 
I. The Brief 
1. The Brief must contain, in the following order: 
Cl) a table of contents, with page references, and a table of 
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cases (alphabetically arranged), statutes and other authorities, 
referring to the page where they are cited; (2) a statement of 
the issues presented; (3) a statement of the nature of the case, 
the course of proceedings and the disposition below, followed by 
a statement of facts with references to the record; (4) an 
argument containing contentions, reasons and citations to 
authorities and the record; (5) a conclusion stating the relief 
sought. Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)-(c). Appellant's Brief must 
include, as a preliminary statement, the name of the Judge who 
rendered the decision and a citation to the opinion, if reported. 
Supp. Rule§ 28(2). The form of the Brief is prescribed by Fed. 
R. App. P. 32 and Supp. Rule § 32. 
2. Except by permission of the Court, principal Briefs 
cannot exceed fifty pages and Reply Briefs cannot exceed 
twenty-five pages, exclusive of pages containing the tables and 
any addendum containing statutes, rules and regulations. Fed. R. 
App. P. 28(f), (g). Excessive footnoting should be avoided. 
3. If pertinent authorities come to the attention of the 
party after the Brief is filed or after oral argument but before 
decision, that party should promptly advise the Court by letter, 
with a copy to opposing counsel, setting forth the citations. 
Fed • R.. App . P .. 2 8 ( j ) . 
4. Parties should be referred to in the Brief by name or 
description rather than "appellant" or "appellee." Fed. R. App. 
P .. 28(d). 
17 
5. Some deficiencies noted: excessive quotation of the 
record and authorities; inaccurate citations; typographical and 
grammatical errors; outdated authorities; disorganized arguments; 
failure to identify and distinguish adverse precedent; lack of 
clarity; prolix sentences; uninformative point headings; 
inadequate statement of the issues presented; incomplete factual 
presentation; statement of the facts through summary of witness• 
testimony rather than narrative; discussion of material outside 
the record; use of slang; inclusion of sarcasm, personal attacks 
and other irrelevant matters; excessive_ number of points; lack of 
reasoned argument; illogical and unsupportable conclusions; 
failure to meet adversary's arguments; failure to recognize that 
the purpose of the Brief is to persuade.· See Supp. Rule§ 28(1). 
II. The Appendix 
1. The appellant is responsible for preparing and filing 
the Appendix to the Briefs. It must contain: Cl) the docket 
entries in the proceeding below; (2) relevant portions of the 
pleadings, charge, findings or opinion; (3) the judgment, order 
or decision in question; (4) other parts of the record to which 
the parties wish to direct the Court's attention. Generally, 
memoranda of law filed below should not be included. Fed. R. 
App. P. 30(a). The form of the Appendix is governed by Fed. R. 
App. P. 32. 
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2. The parties are encouraged to agree on the contents of 
the Appendix. If they cannot, the appellant must serve on the 
appellee a designation of the parts of the record to be included 
and a statement of the issues to be presented, within ten days 
after the filing of the record. The appellee then must designate 
the portions of the record it desires to include, within ten days 
thereafter, and the appellant must include the parts so 
designated. Fed. R. App. P. 30(b). 
3. Unless the parties otherwise agree, the cost of 
producing the Appendix must be paid initially by appellant. If 
the appellant considers the items designated by appellee 
unnecessary, the appellee must be so advised and must then 
advance the costs of including those items. The cost of 
production is taxed as costs, except that the cost of producing 
unnecessary items may be imposed on the requesting party. Local 
rules may provide for sanctions to be imposed upon "attorneys who 
unreasonably and vexatiously increase the costs of litigation 
through the inclusion of unnecessary material in the appendix." 
Id. (Although the Second Circuit has not yet adopted such a 
rule, these sanctions have been imposed under the Court's 
inherent powers.) 
4. An alternative method, allowing for deferred preparation 
of the Appendix, is provided, and the Appendix may be dispensed 
with altogether in appeals conducted under the Criminal Justice 
Act. Fed. R. App. P. 30(c); Supp. Rule§ 30. When exhibits are 
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designated for inclusion, they may be bound in a separate volume, 
suitably indexed with a description of each exhibit. Fed. R. 
App. P. 30(e); Supp. Rule§ 30. 
5. Preparation of an appropriate Appendix is an important 
factor in successful appellate advocacy. Underinclusion is just 
as serious a deficiency as overinclusion. Frequently, Briefs 
refer to matters in the record that are not included in the 
Appendix. This creates an unfavorable impression on the Court. 
III. Oral Argument 
1. Although the Court is authorized to dispense with oral 
argument in certain cases, Supp. Rule§ 34(g), the custom in the 
Second Circuit is to allow it whenever requested. Time requests 
are passed on by the presiding judge, and the time currently 
allowed to each side averages ten to fifteen minutes. Appellant 
may reserve time for rebuttal. Argument is heard by a panel of 
three judges. Once a case is set for oral argument, there may be 
no continuance, except by order of the Court on good cause shown. 
Fed. R. App. P. 34. Engagement of counsel (other than in the 
Supreme Court) is not good cause. Supp. Rule § 34. 
Oral argument is a very important element of appellate 
advocacy and should not be waived. It presents an important 
opportunity to persuade the Court. The Second Circuit is a "hot 
bench" and the judges welcome the opportunity to clarify their 
thinking and that of their colleagues through the interchange 
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with counsel. A judge's tentative conclusions about a case have 
been "turned around" on many occasions by oral argument. 
3. Some deficiencies noted: reading from a prepared text; 
quoting extensively from a case or from the record; deferring 
answers to questions; referring to the Brief rather than 
responding directly to the inquiry; lack of preparation; lack of 
familiarity with precedential cases decided since the filing of 
the Briefs; excessive discussion of the facts; lack of 
familiarity with relevant facts; unnecessary discussion of basic 
legal principles; unfamiliarity with cases cited; responding with 
a "guess"; lack of a structured argument; ineffective 
presentation of the issues; insufficient voice volume; 
distracting mannerisms; answering questions with questions; 
attempting to cover too many points; emotional arguments. 
IV. Sanctions 
1. The sanction of dismissal may be imposed for failure to 
comply with time limitations or any rule or order related to the 
appeal. Supp. Rule § 38; Plan, sec. 11. 
DECISION MAKING 
I. Initial decision making 
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1. The median time for processing criminal appeals in the 
Second Circuit is 6 months, the fastest in the nation. See 
Second Circuit Report 1988, at 7. A decision may come in the 
form of a written opinion or a summary order. Decisions may be 
announced from the bench, but such dispositions are rare, except 
in the case of argued motions. Summary orders are not formal 
opinions and are unreported. Since they are considered to serve 
"no jurisprudential purpose," they may not be cited or otherwise 
referred to in unrelated cases before the Second Circuit or any 
other court. Rules Relating to the Organization of the Court § 
0.23. 
2. Tentative votes are taken at conferences held 
immediately following oral argument or at the end of the week. 
Voting memoranda, giving reasons for the tentative votes, are 
exchanged in a number of cases. Writing assignments are made by 
the senior active judge, unless that judge dissents, in which 
case the assignment is made by the next senior active judge. 
Drafts of opinions and summary orders undergo extensive review by 
panel members, and positions frequently are re-aligned. Summary 
orders generally are not used in cases of reversal, and any 
panel member may object to decision by summary order. 
3. Following receipt of the opinion or order, the Clerk 
enters judgment and, on the same date, mails copies of the 
opinion or orders to the parties. Fed. R. App. P. 36. The 
mandate issues twenty-one days thereafter, "unless the time is 
22 
shortened or enlarged by order .. " Fed .. R .. App. P .. 41 (a).. See 
Plan, sec .. 13 .. 
II. Post-judgment decision making 
1. The decision-making process may continue with a petition 
to the panel for rehearing, which must be filed within fourteen 
days after entry of judgment unless the time is shortened or 
enlarged by order. The petition must particularize the points of 
law or fact petitioner contends were overlooked or misapprehended 
in the opinion. Oral argument ordinarily is not permitted, and 
no answer to the petition will be received unless the court so 
requires. Fed. R. App. P. 40; ~also Supp. Rule § 40. 
2. The petition for rehearing may also contain a 
"suggestion" for rehearing in bane. The vote of a majority of 
the Circuit Judges in regular active service is necessary to 
secure in bane consideration. An appeal or other proceeding may 
be heard in bane initially, but in bane hearings generally are 
disfavored. They are limited to cases where consideration by the 
full Court is necessary to maintain uniformity of decisions and 
where questions of exceptional importance are involved. Fed. R. 
App. P. 35; Supp. Rule § 
3. Issuance of the mandate is stayed upon timely filing of 
a petition for rehearing. If the petition is denied, the mandate 
issues seven days thereafter. A further stay may be sought by 
motion on notice pending application for writ of certiorari to 
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the U.S. Supreme Court. Fed. R. App. P. 41; Supp. Rule § 41. 
The pendency of a suggestion for rehearing in bane does not 
automatically stay the mandate. Fed. R. App. P. 35(c). 
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POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES 
1. Conviction defined 
A criminal conviction occurs at the entering of the judgment 
of conviction, a document setting forth the plea, the verdict or 
findings and the adjudication and sentence. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 
32(b)(l). 
2. Postconviction relief may be sought through: 
(a) certain mechanisms available preconviction as well as 
postconviction: 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 (new trial in interests of 
justice,·e.g., newly discovered evidence; 
available on motion of defendant only and subject 
to brief time limit); 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 34 (arrest of judgment, e.g., if 
indictment or information does not charge an 
offense, or if no jurisdiction over offense 
charged; on motion of defendant only and also 
subject to short time limit); 
Fed R. Crim. P. 36 (clerical mistakes in 
judgments, orders or other parts of record; motion 
may be brought at any time); 
(b) motion for correction of sentence for changed 
circumstances, brought by government to reflect a 
defendant's subsequent substantial assistance in 
investigation or prosecution of another. Fed R. Crim. 
P. 35(b). Subject to one-year time limit. Id.; 
(c) a timely appeal: 
28 U.S.C. § 3731 regulates appeals by government 
of a criminal decision, judgment or order, the 
appeal of which must not violate double jeopardy; 
28 U.S.C. § 3742 provides that appeal of sentence 
may be taken by defendant or government to court 
of appeals from the district court, or to district 
court from a magistrate; 
(d) petition for coram nobis (seeking relief from factual 
error) under the "All Writs" statute, 28 u.s.c. 
§165l(a), available before or after petitioner is in 
federal custody, see Thomas v. United States, 271 F.2d 
500 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (before); Chin v. United States, 
622 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1980) (after), cert. denied, 450 
U.S. 923 (1981), or while petitioner is serving a 
sentence for a subsequent state conviction, United 
States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954); 
(e) an application for habeas corpus, see 28 u.s.c. § 2241-
2242, by one in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 
state court, id. § 2254, or otherwise in custody; or 
(f) a motion to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
3. Habeas corpus and section 2255 compared: 
(a) Similarities: 
Section 2255 affords federal prisoners a remedy 
identical in scope to federal habeas corpus. 
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Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974). 
Habeas corpus literally means "you have the body," 
and the writs are used to gain release from 
unlawful custody. 
Proceeding by writ of habeas corpus or by motion 
pursuant to section 2255 is not attack on the 
conviction but on the validity of the detention 
and is, therefore, a collateral proceeding rather 
than an appeal. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 
711 (1961); United States v. Dukes, 727 F.2d 34, 
41 (2d Cir. 1984). 
Unlike direct review, a collateral attack may be 
made at any time, Dukes, 727 F.2d at 41, subject 
to the "deliberate delay" doctrine, see Brennan v. 
United States, 867 F.2d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 1989). 
(b) Differences: 
Section 2255 was enacted "to minimize the 
difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings 
by affording the same rights in another more 
convenient forum." United States v. Hayman, 342 
U.S. 206, 219 (1952). 
Whereas an application for habeas corpus is 
directed to the Supreme Court, any justice 
thereof, a district court, or any circuit judge, 
within their respective jurisdictions, 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2241-2242, and jurisdiction in the first 
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instance normally lies in the district court where 
the prisoner is in custody, see generally 16 
Federal Procedure §§ 41:53-41:65, at 350-56 (L. 
Ed. 1983) (hereafter Fed. Proc.), a motion under 
section 2255 is directed to the court that imposed 
the sentence sought to be vacated, set aside, or 
corrected, 28 u.s.c. § 2255. (An application 
under section 2255 usually should be made to the 
sentencing judge, but where that "might 
unnecessarily complicate and delay adjudication of 
a petitioner's substantial mainstream claims," it 
may be made to another judge in the same court. 
Papadakis v. Warden of MCC, 822 F.2d 240, 245 (2d 
Cir. 1987).) 
Section 2255 provides the exclusive remedy for a 
federal prisoner to attack a sentence, Dukes, 727 
F.2d at 40 n.4, except that "where the Section 
2255 procedure is shown to be 'inadequate or 
ineffective,' the Section provides that habeas 
corpus shall remain open to afford the necessary 
hearing," Hayman, 342 U.S. at 223 (quoting§ 
2255). The circumstances under which section 2255 
could be inadequate, however, are virtually 
nonexistent. See C. Wright, 3 Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 591, at 426-28 (2d ed. 1982) 
(hereafter Fed. Pract.). 
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There are circumstances outside of the scope of 
section 2255 where a writ for habeas corpus may be 
used, such as where the sentence itself is not at 
issue (e.g., where the challenge is to revocation 
of parole, or to the manner in which the sentence 
is being executed, or where one is confined 
without judgment or held beyond the expiration of 
sentence) or where one is committed for mental 
incompetency. See 3 id. § 591, at 425-26. 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is 
explicitly provided for in the Constitution. See 
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2. 
In contrast with section 2255, section 2254 of 28 
U.S.C. regulates any habeas action brought in 
federal court by a prisoner in custody pursuant to 
a state court judgment. See 28 u.s.c. § 2254. 
For any habeas proceeding in federal court, 
whether or not brought under section 2254, 
jurisdictional power is conferred by section 2241. 
See 16 Fed. Proc. § 41:40, at 345. 
4. Scope of section 2255 collateral proceedings 
(a) Four grounds for relief: 
"that the sentence was imposed in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States"; 
"that the court was without jurisdiction to impose 
such sentence"; 
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"that the sentence was in excess of the maximum 
authorized by law"; 
that the sentence "is otherwise subject to 
collateral attack." Hill v. United States, 368 
U.S. 424, 426-27 (1962). 
(b) Like habeas corpus, section 2255 requires "exceptional 
circumstances" -- i.e., an error that is either 
"jurisdictional," "constitutional," fundamentally 
defective in that it "inherently results in a complete 
miscarriage of justice," or "an omission inconsistent 
with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure." Hill, 
368 U.S. at 428. 
5. Sufficient grounds for section 2255 
(a) Where indictment on its face fails to state a federal 
offense. Hayle v. United States, 815 F.2d 879, 881-82 
(2d Cir. 19.87). 
(b) Where guilty plea was based on insufficient factual 
basis, see Montgomery v. United States, 853 F.2d 83, 
85-86 (2d Cir. 1988), or was induced by prosecutor's 
false promise, see United States v. Paglia, 190 F.2d 
445, 448 (2d Cir. 1951). 
(c) Right to counsel, e.g., where chosen counsel was not 
admitted to any bar, Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 
160 (2d Cir. 1983); cf. Waterhouse v. Rodriquez, 848 
F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1988) (disbarment of defendant's 
counsel during pretrial suppression hearing did not 
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require vacation of sentence where attorney ceased 
representation immediately upon learning of 
disbarment). 
(d) Claim of perjured testimony. United States v. 
Barillas, 291 F.2d 743, 744-45 (2d Cir. 1961). 
(e) Competency of defendant at time of court proceedings. 
See Saddler v. United States, 531 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 
1976) (per curiam). 
(f) See also§ 7(a) infra (constitutional claims). 
6. Insufficient grounds for section 2255 
(a) Where guilty plea was induced by statutory provision 
subsequently invalidated. United States v. Bass, 477 
F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973). 
(b) Attorney performance not falling below a standard of 
reasonably effective assistance. See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
(c) Request for sentence credit. See United States v. 
Martinez, 837 F.2d 861, 865-66 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Courts 
have original jurisdiction only over the imposition of 
[federal] sentence, not over its computation."). 
7. Constitutional claim 
(a) Found to be constitutional: 
where alleged that separate judgments of 
conviction arose out of single criminal 
transaction, raising questions of double jeopardy. 
Grimes v. United States, 607 F.2d 6, 9-11 (2d Cir. 
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1979) .. 
claim of spillover effects of double-jeopardy-
barred criminal charge. Pacelli v. United States, 
588 F.2d 360, 363-64 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
441 U.S. 908 (1979). 
constitutional authority of de facto judge. 
United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 706-07 (2d 
Cir. 1962). 
composition of grand jury; however, where 
objection is untimely, claim will be procedurally 
barred unless cause is shown and prejudice would 
result from denying claim. Davis v. United 
States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973). 
(b) Found to be nonconstitutional (see§ 11 infra): 
statute of limitations affirmative defense. 
Brennan, 867 F.2d at 117 n.l. 
interpretation of term in statute. Id. 
("enterprise" in RICO statute) .. 
credibility of witnesses. Norris v. United 
States, 687 F.2d 899, 900 (7th Cir. 1982). 
8. Exceptional circumstances found where: 
(a) Subsequent change in law resulting in petitioner's 
"conviction and punishment [having been imposed] for an 
act that the law does not make criminal." Davis v. 
United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974). This rule 
applies even where petitioner failed to raise the issue 
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in the direct appeal, perhaps not having thought of the 
argument that was not yet law, or having decided not to 
challenge well-settled precedent. See Ingber v. Enzor, 
841 F.2d 450, 454 (2d Cir. 1988). 
9. Custody and sentence requirement 
(a) Section 2255 provides a means of remedy for "a prisoner 
in custody under sentence." This custody requirement 
has been read liberally, 3 Fed. Pract. § 596, at 468, 
so that any conditions that significantly confine and 
restrain will suffice, Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 
236, 243 (1963). 
(b) Custody found where: 
defendant released on his own recognizance after 
conviction in state court. Hensley v. Municipal 
Court, 411 U.S. 234 (1973) (habeas corpus action); 
prisoner discharged while petition awaiting 
appellate review. Carafas v. Lavallee, 391 U.S. 
234 (1968) (habeas corpus action); 
petitioner free on parole. Argro v. United 
States, 505 F.2d 1374, 1375 n.l (2d Cir. 1974). 
(c) The critical moment in determining custody is when the 
section 2255 motion is filed. 3 Fed. Pract. § 596, at 
470. 
(d) Fact that successful collateral attack may not result 
in release from custody is no bar to considering 
section 2255 motion. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 
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(1968) (challenge to sentence due to take effect at 
termination of current sentence); Walker v. Wainwright, 
390 U.S. 335 (1968) (separate sentence due to take 
effect at termination of challenged sentence); Grimes, 
607 F.2d at 8-9 (challenge to one basis of single 
general sentence). 
(e) As the rule states, the petitioner also must be under 
sentence for the conviction attacked. Id. at 7. 
10. Hearing 
(a) Section 2255 and Rule 4(b) governing the section, see § 
13 infra, provides that if the motion, file and records 
of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is 
entitled to no relief, a hearing is unnecessary. See 
Garcia Montalvo v. United States, 862 F.2d 425, 426-27 
(2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Williams v. United States, 
503 F.2d 995, 998 (2d Cir. 1974). The determination 
lies within the discretion of the district court, 
Williams, 5.03 F. 2d at 998, notwithstanding the 
government's consent to a hearing, id. 
(b) Nevertheless, a pro se complaint must be liberally 
construed. See Elliott v. Bronson, No. 88-2242, slip. 
op. at 2561 (2d Cir. Apr. 5, 1989) (per curiam). 
(c) Petitioner need not be produced at every section 2255 
hearing. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 222. However, where 
"there are substantial issues of facts as to events in 
which the prisoner participated, the trial court should 
10 
require his production for a hearing." Id.; 
Paglia, 190 F.2d at 448. 
11. Procedural defaults 
also 
(a) Petitioner may be barred from raising a claim under 
section 2255 because of a failure to assert the claim 
at trial or on direct appeal. 
The nature of the claim may be determinative 
whether it is: (a) constitutional or 
jurisdictional; or (b) nonconstitutional and 
nonjurisdictional. See, e.g., Brennan, 867 F.2d 
at 117 & n.1. 
Depending on the nature of the claim and the 
procedural default, two tests have been used to 
determine whether the claim may be heard by way of 
section 2255: (a) "deliberate bypass" -- i.e., 
whether the failure to raise the issue in earlier 
proceedings was a deliberate strategic decision, 
see United States v. West, 494 F.2d 1314 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 899 (1974); and (b) 
cause and prejudice -- i.e., whether petitioner 
can show good cause for the procedural default and 
prejudice resulting from not being allowed to 
raise the issue by section 2255, see United States 
v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982). 
The deliberate bypass test is the narrower 
exception and its application will bar fewer 
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section 2255 claims than will application of the 
cause and prejudice test. See Wainwright v. 
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977). 
(b) Test for constitutional or jurisdictional claims: 
There is an open question in the Second Circuit 
whether the "deliberate bypass" test remains the 
proper standard for foreclosing constitutional and 
jurisdictional issues not raised on direct appeal, 
or whether the "good cause and prejudice" test 
applies. See Brennan, 867 F.2d at 117 n.1. 
(c) Test for nonconstitutional and nonjurisdictional 
claims. 
A failure to object at trial forecloses review, 
subject to petitioner's satisfying the cause and 
prejudice test. Id. at 119 (statute of limitations 
affirmative defense not raised at trial). 
As a general rule, the failure to raise a 
nonconstitutional or nonjurisdictional claim on 
direct review precludes assertion of the claim in 
a collateral proceeding. Id. at 117, 120. 
In "exceptional circumstances," however, even a 
nonconstitutional or nonjurisdictional error can 
result in a "complete miscarriage of justice," 
justifying collateral relief. Id. at 117, 121; 
see Ingber, 841 F.2d at 454. 
(d) The failure of counsel to take an appeal when requested 
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to do so may itself be ground for section 2255 review. 
See Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327 (1969). 
(e) Effect of plea: 
After judgment on plea of guilty, defendant may 
not raise under section 2255 nonjurisdictional 
challenges. Hayle, 815 F.2d at 881. Any 
jurisdictional defect must be apparent from the 
face of the indictment. Id. at 881-82. 
12. Time for 2255 motion 
(a) The "motion for ... relief may be made at any time." 
28 u.s.c. § 2255. 
(b) There must be a sentence imposed on the complained-of 
conviction in order to confer jurisdiction for 
collateral attack. Grimes, 607 F.2d at 7. 
(c) Neither laches, Pacelli, 588 at 360, nor any statute of 
limitations applies to the making of a section 2255 
motion. 3 Fed. Pract. § 597, at 480. 
(d) Nevertheless, delays can be taken into account by the 
court ruling on section 2255 motion. Pacelli, 588 F.2d 
at 365. 
(e) Rule 9(a) of the Section 2255 Rules provides that the 
motion may be dismissed if delay caused the government 
to be prejudiced in its ability to respond, unless the 
movant shows that the motion "is based on grounds of 
which he could not have had knowledge by the exercise 
of reasonable diligence before the circumstances 
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prejudicial to the government occurred." Section 2255 
Rule 9(a). "It is the government's ability to respond 
to the motion, not its ability to retry the defendant 
successfully, that is relevant." 3 Fed. Pract. § 597, 
at 482. 
(f) Delay may be disregarded, however, where (1) there is a 
change in law or new evidence, and (2) the interests of 
justice would be served and the petitioner makes a 
proper showing why a particular ground for relief was 
not asserted. Advisory Committee Note to Rule 9(a) of 
the Habeas Corpus Rules (incorporated by reference in 
Note to Rule 9(a) of the Section 2255 Rules -- see § 13 
infra). 
(g) A new rule of criminal procedure formulated after 
conviction is final generally is not to be applied 
retroactively, except where the new rule either "places 
'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct 
beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority 
to proscribe'" or "requires the observance of 'those 
procedures that ... are "implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty."'" Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 
1073 (1989) (citations omitted). 
13. Procedure 
Rules and Forms have been adopted by the Supreme Court to 
govern proceedings under section 2255. See Rules Governing 
Proceedings in the United States District Courts Under 
14 
Section 2255 of Title 28, United States Code ("Section 2255 
Rules"). 
14. Mislabeling: labels not decisive 
(a) Mislabeled as petition for habeas corpus, treated as 
2255 motion. Dukes, 727 F.2d at 40 n.4. 
(b) Mislabeled as petition for coram nobis, treated as 2255 
motion. United States v. Little, 608 F.2d 296, 299 
(8th 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1089 (1980). 
(c) Mislabeled as petition under 2255, treated as coram 
nobis petition. United States v. Loschiavo, 531 F.2d 
659, 662 (2d Cir. 1976). 
15. Appellate Review of 2255 motions 
(a) Section 2255 itself provides that an order under 
section 2255 is appealable. 
(b) Time limits for civil appeals apply. Section 2255 Rule 
11; United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 209 n.4 
(1952); see also Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). 
(c) Because the United States is a party to all section 
2255 proceedings, notice of appeal must be filed within 
60 days of entry of the district court's order. Fed. 
R. App. 4(a). The United States also may appeal. See 
Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 337-38 (1963); 
Bonfiglio v. Hadden, 770 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1985). 
However, section 2255 cannot be "staged" in form to 
circumvent a prohibition on government appellate 
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